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ASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS
AFFECTING FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION
Within the limits of federal jurisdiction prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress has the power to define the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. Occasionally, the legislators have used that
power to withhold from those courts part of the jurisdiction permitted
by the Constitution.' A good example is federal diversity jurisdiction.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution provides that "The Judicial
power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of
different States." The district courts, however, have been given the
power to hear such cases only in certain circumstances. The
limitations have been accomplished by express and implied statutory
exceptions 2 to the grant of a general power to hear diversity cases. 3
1. There are two arguments that any Congressional limitation on the jurisdiction
provided in the Constitution is void. The first is that the Constitution automatically vests
jurisdiction in the federal courts established by Congress, and Congress may not legisla-
tively restrict that jurisdiction. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483, 506 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Friendly]. The second argument is
that even if the jurisdiction of the lower federal court derives from Congress, not the
Constitution, Congress has a duty to confer jurisdiction to the extent provided therein.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (dicta); Brown, The
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L.
REV. 179, 180 (1929). Moreover, Congress must establih lower federal courts be-
cause the power to create such courts (article III, section I and article I, section 8)
carries with it the implied condition that such power will be exercised. Howland,
Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of Different States be
Preserved?, 18 A.B.AJ. 499, 503 (1932).
These arguments have been unsuccessful and the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts. The clearest statement of the rule is Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1922). The Company, a Missouri corporation, brought suit in federal court
against citizens of Arkansas. The Court rejected the Company's argument that
allowing a concurrent suit concerning the same subject matter in a state court would
make the proceeding in federal court futile, thus depriving it of its right, under the
Constitution and acts of Congress, to sue in federal court:
[Congress] may jive, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, pro-
vided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. The Con-
stitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in the
enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer it. And the jurisdic-
tion having been conferred may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or
in part.
Id. at 234 (citations omitted). See also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850);
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); McIntyre v. Wood, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 503
(1813); Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dal.) 6 (1799). See generally D.
CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 87-105 (1968).
2. Statutory limitations include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) ($10,000 amount in contro-
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Despite the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins4 and its progeny, there are advantages to
being able to sue or defend in federal court.5 It is therefore important
for attorneys to be able to determine accurately whether the district
courts may hear a case. Also, precise statutes will aid the courts in
quickly progressing from jurisdictional issues to the merits. Thus, the
statutory restrictions on the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction
should be clearly defined and specific enough to allow consistent
application. 6 With respect to one of these limitations, 28 U.S.C. §
1359, 7 clarity has not been attained.
The problems with section 1359 are caused by its imprecise
language: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
In applying this statute, the following questions must be asked: (1)
what facts will show that a party was "improperly or collusively made
or joined"; 8 (2) what facts indicate that there was a purpose to invoke
federal jurisdiction; and (3) will the existence of other "legitimate"
purposes bar application of the statutory prohibition? The discovery
of definite answers to these questions has been left to the courts.
Unfortunately, " [f] ew general principles.., appear to be carried
forward through the cases to govern decision in subsequent cases
presenting different factual contexts." 9
This comment examines the application of section 1359 to
assignments and transfers which affect federal diversity jurisdiction.10
versy requirement), 1332 (c) (defining the citizenship of corporations and insurance com-
panies), and 1359 (1970). For a discussion of court imposed limitations see Vestal and
Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1956).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
4. 302 U.S. 64(1938).
5. See Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933 (1962); McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of
"General Law" in the Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 144 (1938).
6. Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928
(1962). See also Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1968).
7. 28 U.S.C.§ 1359 (1970).
8. The "improperly or collusively" test is also used to determine the real party
in interest required under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). See, e.g., Dunham v. Robertson,
198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952).
9. Ferrera v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967),
aff'd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
10. Section 1359 is applicable in other situations. The courts are divided as to
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Throughout the following discussion, the focus is directed toward the
determination of more uniform standards for the interpretation of the
statute. The purpose of section 1359, from which general guidelines
may be drawn, is examined in part I. Part II includes a survey of cases
which have dealt with assignments and transfers to invoke or defeat
federal diversity jurisdiction. Certain factors the courts have relied on,
and certain rules they have developed, in attempting to answer the
questions posed above will be explained, and the decisions will be
evaluated in light of the guidelines established in part I.
I. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1359
The first inquiry in the interpretation of any statute is to the purpose
for which it was enacted. Some courts have found the purpose of sec-
tion 1359 to be the prevention of frauds upon their jurisdiction.11 Fraud,
however, is as imprecise a term as "improperly or collusively" and is
of little help in establishing general guidelines for application of the
statute to particular factual situations. A more precise definition of the
purpose of section 1359 requires an analysis of the purpose of federal
diversity jurisdiction, for, as previously noted, section 1359 is a limi-
tation on the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Following extensive and heated debate, the provision authorizing
federal diversity jurisdiction was added to the Constitution.12 The con-
troversy continued as amendments which would have withheld that
jurisdiction from the lower federal courts were introduced and subse-
quently defeated.' 3 It is from the debates regarding the original grant
whether its prohibition applies in the case of an appointment of a non-resident exe-
cutor or administrator. Comment, Appointment of Non-resident Administrators to
Create Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 873 (1964). It is clear that if the
transaction is improper or collusive and the only purpose is to create federal juris-
diction, section 1359 prohibits a district court from taking jurisdiction in the case of
an assignment or transfer to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910). Proof of
some other legitimate purpose will probably allow the district court to take jurisdic-
tion. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933). See also text accompanying notes
70-75, infra.
Section 1359 applies to both the original and removal jurisdiction of the district
courts based on diversity of citizenship.
II. See, e.g., Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 209 (1881). Williams dealt
with the predecessor of section 1359, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472,
which contained the same prohibition. See text accompanying notes 29-30, infra.
12. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. Some of the original constitutional plans did not in-
clude such a provision. Friendly, supra note 1, at 484-85.
13. These amendments were of two types. The first, which was actually introduced
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and the subsequently proposed amendments that the purpose of federal
jurisdiction may be discovered. Alexander Hamilton argued that its
purpose was to provide for the enforcement of the privileges and im-
munities clause. 14 His analysis is probably incorrect, however for "a writ
of error to any State Court disregarding that Clause was an adequate
remedy."15
The generally accepted view is that federal diversity jurisdiction
was adopted to provide non-residents an impartial tribunal free from
the possibility of local prejudice which might prevail against them in
courts in the state of which their adversary was a citizen. 16 Federal
courts, with juries drawn from a larger population and judges
appointed for life, offer this protection. Even this view has been
challenged. One commentator has claimed that such a purpose "has
been written into the clause [providing for federal diversity
jurisdiction] by judicial interpretation"'17 rather than by an honest
examination of the purpose of the founding fathers. This argument is
prior to the adoption of the Constitution itself, would have restricted federal diversity
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court by removing Congress' power to create lower federal
courts. H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 153 (1971). Similar amendments.
which would have limited Congress' power to the creation of admiralty courts, were
proposed during the first congress. Friendly, supra note 1. at 502: Warren, New Light
on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 123 (1923) [here-
inafter cited as Warren].
The second type would simply have removed the diversity clause from the Constitu-
tion. Sponsors of these amendments argued that state courts could deal with diversity
cases just as fairly and efficiently as the federal courts, and the expense of creating the
lower federal courts could thereby be avoided. Friendly, supra note I, at 502. These
amendments were rejected on the grounds that the lower federal courts would have to be
established anyway, to handle admiralty cases, and that there was a lack of confidence in
state judiciaries.
14. THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 590 tJ. Hamilton ed. 1909) (A. Hamilton).
15. Warren, supra note 13, at 82-83.
16. Id. at 83. It is important to note that it is the fear of local prejudice. not the ac-
tual existence of prejudice, against which federal diversity jurisdiction protects. See
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (Frankfurter, J. concurring):
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). In Deveaux, Chief
Justice Marshall stated "that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on
this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suit-
ors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between
aliens and citizens, or between citizens of different states." 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87
(emphasis added). This distinction is important to the continued validity of federal di-
versity jurisdiction. If actual prejudice was the test, it might be argued that that jurisdic-
tion should be abolished because actual prejudice is no longer demonstrable. On the
other hand, there is evidence that the fear of local prejudice still exists. See 51 VA. L. REV.
178, 179-84 (1965); Summers, Analysis of the Factors that Influence Choice of
Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933, 937-38 (1962).
17. Friendly, supra note 1, at 492.
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based on the assumption that, because there was no valid reason for a
fear of local prejudice in state courts during the time the Articles of
Confederation were in force, there is no reason to suspect that
protection against that fear was the purpose of the constitutional
provision for that jurisdiction.' 8 Rather, it is suggested that the real
fear was of the local prejudice of state legislators who appointed state
judges and who often had the power to control the ultimate disposition
of law suits. However, the existence of other sources of local prejudice
and the fact that there may have been only isolated cases in which
such prejudice was shown by state courts does not justify rejection of
the idea that local prejudice was in fact feared. Many scholars have
noted that the authors of the Constitution were impressed by the need
for a strong national economy, which could only be achieved if
businessmen could move around the country free from the
apprehension incident to suing and being sued in the courts of the
state of their adversaries.' 9 Thus, as Chief Justice Marshall noted in
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,20 federal diversity jurisdiction
was provided to protect against- the possible fears of non-residents,
"[h] owever true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation."
Given this purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction, it might be
argued that the federal courts should have the power to hear all cases
in which the citizenship of any of the opponents is diverse. However,
the decision to invest those courts with diversity jurisdiction was left
to Congress,21 and in the exercise of this discretion the members of
the first Congress did not extend the protection of federal jurisdiction
so far. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss2 2 the United States Supreme Court
held that those legislators, in providing the statutory basis for federal
diversity jurisdiction, intended to allow the lower federal courts to
hear only those cases in which the citizenship of each of the plaintiffs
is different from that of each of the defendants. According to the
Court, the first Congress apparently believed that the common
citizenship of any pair of opponents would avoid local prejudice,
18. Id. at 493.
19. See, e.g., Moore and Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Fu-
ture, 43 TExAs L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1964); Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.AJ. 71, 75 (1933).
20. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
21. See note 1, supra.
22. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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regardless of the citizenship of other parties to the suit. Although this
interpretation does not conform to the generally accepted purpose of
the constitutional provision for federal diversity jurisdiction 23 and
although Congress possesses the power to provide otherwise, 24 the
Strawbridge complete diversity rule remains. Thus, until Congress
changes this rule, the purpose of the statutory diversity jurisdiction of
the district courts is to protect against the fear of local prejudice only
when there is complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants.
The first Congress, in extending diversity jurisdiction to the lower
federal courts, also recognized that assignments present special
opportunities for abuse of that jurisdiction. Presumably, this was the
reason those courts were prohibited, in section 11 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789,25 from exercising jurisdiction in "any suit to recover the
contents of any promissory note or other chose of action in favor of
an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to
recover the said contents if no assignment has been made." The scope
of this provision, however, when considered in light of the purpose of
federal diversity jurisdiction as interpreted in Strawbridge, was too
broad. If the assignor were a citizen of the same state as the assignee's
opponent and had retained an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, section 11 would be appropriate. The assignor could be
considered a party to the suit by the assignee and, as such, the suit
would not be within the Strawbridge interpretation of the extent of
federal diversity jurisdiction. The statute, however, went farther. It
not only prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction in cases in which the
assignor retained an interest, but also in cases in which he parted with
all his interest. In the latter case, if the assignee were not a citizen of
the same state as his opponent, the only adversaries would be citizens
of different states. The assignor could not be considered a party and,
therefore, protection against the fear of local prejudice might bejustified.
Section 11 was repealed in 1948 by the same Act in which section
1359 was adopted. 26 Commentators almost completely ignored the
23. See, Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 18-25 (1968). Even Chief Justice Marshall regretted this decision. C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 24 (1970).
24. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
25. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. Foreign bills of exchange were
excepted.
26. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935.
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adoption of section 1359,27 perhaps because a similar statute had
been in force since 1875.28 The 1875 Act provided, in addition to the
prohibition now in section 1359, that the lower federal courts could
not exercise jurisdiction in cases which did "not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within" their
jurisdiction. It was probably adopted to solve a problem created
when, also in the 1875 Act,29 section 11 was amended to exempt
from its application promissory notes negotiable by the law merchant.
This exemption would have allowed a great number of suits based on
assignments to be tried in federal court merely because the assignee
plaintiff or defendant was a citizen of a state other than that of his
opponent. The assignor could have retained an interest without
barring the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction even though he
should have been considered a party. If he were a citizen of the same
state as the assignee's opponent, the suit was not one for which the
protection federal diversity jurisdiction affords was intended.
Therefore, the jurisdictional limitations of the 1875 Act and those of
section 11 attacked the same problem: abuses of federal diversity
jurisdiction. Yet while the latter was absolute in its terms, having no
regard to the question of whether protection of the non-resident
assignee was necessary, the 1875 Act was more flexible. It forced the
courts to focus on the nature of the controversy to determine whether
the transaction by which the assignee acquired title made the suit one
to which federal diversity jurisdiction was not intended to apply,
rather than merely on the citizenship of the assignor as required by
27. A short discussion, with no indication of the purpose of section 1359, appears in
J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 160 (1949).
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472 provided:
That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a State court to
a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit
court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such
suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been
improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the
purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit
court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the
court from which it was removed as justice may require, and shall make such order
as to costs as shall be just....
This provision was also repealed when section 1359 was adopted. Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935.
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 472. This provision was changed to
exempt promissory notes made by corporations. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24
Stat. 552.
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section 11. Transfers came within the scope of the statutory
prohibition for the first time.30 A curious limitation was added. Under
the 1875 Act, even if a transfer or assignment were determined to be
improper or collusive, jurisdiction was not barred unless the purpose
of the assignment was to invoke federal jurisdiction. This limitation is
curious because improper or collusive are conclusionary terms,
seemingly broad enough to encompass a purpose to manufacture
federal jurisdiction. This limitation will be considered in part II.
The 1875 Act and section 1359 are so similar that the purpose of
the former should be attributed to the latter. Thus, section 1359
requires the federal courts to closely scrutinize assignments and
transfers to determine whether the subsequent controversy is one to
which the protection of federal diversity jurisdiction should apply.
The identification of cases in which the statutory prohibition applies is
a problem with which the federal courts have struggled for nearly one
hundred years.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND SECTION 1359
" [J] urisdiction represents the distribution of judicial power in our
federal system as blueprinted by the Constitution and declared by
Congress; and the federal courts ought therefore to be mindful to stay
within defined limits." 3 ' The federal courts have always held that the
limit of federal jurisdiction prescribed by section 1359 prohibits them
from hearing cases to which their diversity jurisdiction was not in-
tended to apply.3 2 Before examining the facts the courts have looked
to in attempting to remain within the jurisdictional boundary pre-
30. Improper and collusive transfers had been prohibited at common law for some
time. See, e.g., Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867); Jones v. League. 59
U.S. (18 How.) 76 (1855); Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849); McDonald
v. Smalley, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 620 (1828); Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 330
(1797); Maxwell's Lessee v. Levy, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 380 (1797).
For example, in Maxwell's Lessee v. Levy, a citizen of Pennsylvania conveyed his
interest in land to the lessor plaintiff, a citizen of Maryland, for the purpose of creating
federal jurisdiction. The Court held the transfer colorable and collusive and an insuffi-
cient basis for federal jurisdiction because no consideration passed from the plaintiff to
the transferor for the conveyance. The opposite result was reached in Smith because the
assignment was for value.
3 1. J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 160 (1949).
32. See, e.g., Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823 (1969); Ferrera v. Philadel-
phia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967), affd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.
1968).
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scribed by section 1359, the procedures they have adopted in making
such inquiries should be noted.
First, while section 1359 may always be advanced by a party to the
suit as a bar to the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction, the court
must acknowledge the defect on its own motion whenever it appears
that the statutory prohibition may apply.33 Second, if jurisdiction is
challenged by either party or by the court, the burden is on the party
asserting jurisdiction to prove the facts necessary to sustain it.34
Finally, whenever an assignment or transfer under which a party
claims title to the subject matter in controversy is challenged as im-
proper or collusive within the meaning of section 1359, the court
must examine all the conditions and circumstances surrounding the
transaction in deciding whether- to exercise jurisdiction.35
Although these procedures are well-suited to the identification of
cases in which the courts should refuse to exercise jurisdiction, the
question of what particular factual situations require a refusal re-
mains. This question will be considered first with regard to assign-
ments and transfers which create federal diversity jurisdiction. The
use of assignments and transfers to defeat that jurisdiction will be
examined separately, for, by its terms, section 1359 does not apply to
such schemes. The third section of this part will include an appraisal
of the problems created by section 1359 and the need for limitations
on the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction.
33. Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209 (1881). Williams concerned the predecessor
of section 1359, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472. The 1875 Act was quite
specific in imposing this duty on the court. See note 28, supra. Although section 1359 is
not as specific, it has been held that the federal courts are similarly obligated to raise thejurisdictional issue if it appears that the statutory prohibition may apply and the parties
have not raised the issue. Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 928 (1962).
34. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). The reason
for placing the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction is that, because the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against jurisdic-
tion throughout the case. Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278 (1883); Town
of Lantana, Florida v. Hopper, 102 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1939). Despite the decision in
McNutt, one district court has recently held that the burden of proving collusion under
section 1359 is on the party alleging it. Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn.
1968).
35. Dickson v. Tattnal County Hospital Authority, 316 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Ga.
1970). This includes a consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and other
documentary evidence. Henley v. Miller Golf Equip. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 872 (D. P. R.
1969).
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A. Assignments and Transfers Creating Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction
An example of the most common situation in which section 1359
might be advanced as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction will be
helpful before discussing the question of whether the statutory prohi-
bition applies. Two citizens of Washington make a contract and one
fails to perform. The other party then assigns his rights under the con-
tract to a citizen of another state who sues the breaching party in fed-
eral court. In applying section 1359 to these kinds of cases, the courts
have recognized that there are two tests in the statutory language. 36
The first is whether the transaction by which the assignee or transferee
acquires title to the subject matter in controversy is improper or collu-
sive, and the second is whether the purpose of that transaction was to
invoke federal jurisdiction. The two tests are separate, yet both
must be answered affirmatively to apply the statutory prohibition.
The well-established rule with regard to the first test is that a
transfer or assignment is not improper or collusive if the assignor or
transferor parts with all of his interest in the subject matter in contro-
versy.37 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and
Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.38 is often cited as authority for this
proposition even though the rule actually predates the 1875 Act in
which the improper or collusive test was first adopted. 39 The factual
situation Black and White illustrates the extreme situation in which
the complete transaction rule was applied, for the transfer was clearly
made for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction. Shortly before
the suit, plaintiff Black and White was incorporated in Tennessee by
shareholders of a Kentucky corporation of the same name. All the
assets of the Kentucky corporation were transferred to the plaintiff
and the former was dissolved. The plaintiff continued the same busi-
ness in Kentucky and then brought suit in federal district court against
two Kentucky corporations. The Court held the exercise of federal
jurisdiction was correct; the transfer was not improper or collusive
36. Many of the cases discussed in this section were decided under the 1875 Act.
which included the same test now found in section 1359. See text accompanying notes
25-26, supra. Since the tests are identical, only section 1359 will be referred to.
37. See generally, 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.05, at 157 (2d ed. 1968).
38. 276U.S.518(1928).
39. See note 30, supra.
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because it was a complete transaction in which the transferor retained
no interest.
The issue in the first test, then, is: when has the assignor or trans-
feror retained an interest in the subject matter of the controversy? The
courts have identified several factual situations as indicative that the
transferor or assignor has retained an interest in the subject matter and
outcome of the litigation. The most common is an assignment for
collection only. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.40 is a recent ex-
ample. Respondent Caribbean Mills, a Haitian corporation, failed to
perform a contract it had made with a Panamanian corporation. To
allow the suit to be heard in federal district court,41 the Panamanian
corporation assigned its entire interest in the contract to petitioner
Kramer for one dollar stated consideration. By separate agreement,
Kramer promised to pay ninety-five percent of the damages he re-
covered to his assignor. The Court held the "pay back" agreement,
coupled with Kramer's lack of previous connection with the contro-
versy, made the assignment one for collection only and, therefore,
improper or collusive within the meaning of section 1359. The as-
signor retained a substantial interest in the rights assigned. The same
result has been reached in cases involving assignments and transfers of
bonds and other instruments of indebtedness for collection only42 and
the transfer of a tort claim in trust for the benefit of the injured par-
ties. 43 Most assignments for collection only are easily identified by an
agreement by the assignee to pay the amount recovered, less a speci-
fied percentage to cover the expenses of bringing the suit and some
compensation, to the assignor.44 It is correct to hold that the assignor
has retained an interest in the subject matter in controversy because
he will directly benefit from any recovery by the assignee.
The ability of the transferee to assert defenses to a suit by the trans-
40. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
41. Diversity jurisdiction includes the power to hear suits between aliens and citi-
zens of a state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970). As Kramer illustrates, section 1359 ap-
plies to these types of cases as well.
42. See, e.g., Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910); Inhabitants of the Town-
ship of Bernards v. Stebbins, 109 U.S. 341 (1883); Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209
(1881).
43. Ferrera v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967),
affd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
44. For example, in Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910), items of indebted-
ness had been assigned to the plaintiff with "the agreement that each of the several assig-
nors should remain the absolute owner of his or their claims, and should contribute his
proportion of the expenses of collection." Id. at 119.
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feror to recover on the debt owed him by the transferee in considera-
tion of the transfer should not be a consideration in determining
whether the transferor has retained an interest. 45 Resolution of the ju-
risdictional issue cannot await a suit between the two to determine the
validity of those defenses.
The transferee's lack of association with the subject matter in con-
troversy has often been held to show that the transferor has retained
an interest in the property, thus rendering the transfer improper or
collusive. Examples are cases in which the transferee has never seen
the property to which he claims title,46 has never received title or does
not learn of a bill of sale executed to him until shortly before the suit
is commenced. 47 None of these factors, standing alone, should consti-
tute collusion or impropriety, but in combination they may show that
the transferor or assignor did not part with his interest. These cases
usually also involve a lack of consideration for the transfer, another
factor the courts have looked to in deciding whether the assignor or
transferor has retained an interest. Stated consideration is not suf-
ficient; the courts have required that such consideration actually be
paid.48 Whether non-negotiable notes which have not been paid at the
time the suit is commenced will satisfy the consideration requirement
is an unresolved question. In Farmington Village Corp. v. Pillsbury49
the Court held such unpaid notes would not satisfy the consideration
requirement, but there the transfer was accompanied by an agreement
by the transferee to pay the assignor fifty percent of the recovery in
excess of the amount of the note. Absent such a payback agreement,
the proper test would seem to be whether the transferor and transferee
had agreed that the notes would not be paid if the latter failed to re-
cover or that some of the debt might be forgiven if the recovery were
less than the amount of the notes. Facts from which such an agree-
ment might be implied should also be considered.
45. Peterson v. Sucro, 93 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1938). In Peterson, the defendant con-
tended that a conveyance of land was improper or collusive because the notes were
non-negotiable and the deed contained covenants of warranty, breach of which might
allow the transferee to offset any claim on the notes.
46. See, e.g., Hayden v. Manning, 106 U.S. 586 (1883); Little v. Giles, 118 U.S. 596
(1886). In Little, the transferee of land had never even been in the city in which the land
was located, nor did he know its value.
47. Lake County Comm'rs v. Dudley, 173 U.S. 243 (1899).
48. Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302 (1902); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly,
160 U.S. 327 (1895); Little v. Giles, 118 U.S. 596 (1886); Hayden v. Manning, 106 U.S.
586(1883).
49. 114 U.S. 138(1885).
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An exception to the consideration requirement is a transfer by gift.
Absent an improper agreement, a failure of delivery, or a donee unas-
sociated with the subject matter, a gift will divest the donor of all of
his interest and should not be considered improper or collusive.50
The transferor or assignor has surely retained an interest if he holds
back part of the property.51 A more difficult question is presented
when the assignor parts with all his interest, but he holds some power
to compel a reconveyance. In Lehigh Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Kelly52
a Virginia corporation had claimed lands owned by residents of that
state. A Pennsylvania corporation was organized by the stockholders
of the Virginia corporation and all of the latter's interest in the land was
transferred. The Pennsylvania corporation then brought suit in federal
court to establish its title to the land. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held the power of the shareholders to compel a recon-
veyance from the Pennsylvania to the Virginia corporation without
valuable consideration was equivalent to an agreement to reconvey
and, therefore, improper or collusive.53 Cases in which the assignor
corporation is dissolved prior to th6 commencement of a suit by the
assignee54 or is about to be dissolved at that time55 are distinguishable, for
there is no longer an assignor to whom a reconveyance may be com-
pelled. The results in cases dealing with a power to compel a recon-
veyance seem correct to the extent they deal only with the retained in-
terest test. Any recovery by the assignee or transferee will almost cer-
tainly be returned, in some manner, to the transferor or assignor. Thus,
the courts are justified in holding that the transferor has retained an
50. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904). This case does not, of
course, involve diversity of citizenship, but its principles should apply -to diversity cases.
51. Ikeler v. Deposit Trust Co., 39 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
52. 160 U.S. 327 (1895).
53. Id. at 337. The same result was reached in Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal
& Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908). In that case, the transferor corporation received
all the stock of the transferee corporation in exchange for the assets transferred.
54. Black and White Taxicab and Trans. Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Trans. Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
55. Cf., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F.2d 439 (8th
Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 585 (1928). The court held that the test was whether the
transferee corporation was so independent and free as to the property transfered as tojustify jurisdiction, regardless of whether the transferor corporation was in existence and
could have compelled a reconveyance at the time the suit was filed. Factors such as (1) a
close identity between the assignor and assignee and (2) the nature of the assignee's in-
terest in the subject matter have been examined in determining whether the assignee was
sufficiently independent and free to allow the court to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Henley & Co. v. Miller Golf Equip. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 872 (D.P.R. 1969); Steinberg v.
Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R. 1951).
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interest in the property and that the transaction is improper or collu-
sive within the meaning of section 1359.
If the assignor has control of the litigation, has solicited the as-
signee to bring suit, and has agreed to reimburse the assignee for his
expenses, the courts have held that the transaction is improper or col-
lusive.56 Such facts show that the assignor has retained an interest in
the subject matter; the presumption that the proceeds of a suit by the
assignee will be paid to the assignor is justified. 57
In determining whether a transfer or assignment is improper or col-
lusive, should the only test be whether the assignor or transferor re-
tained an interest in the subject matter? Both "improperly" and "col-
lusively" are broad enough terms to include a complete transfer or as-
signment accomplished to invoke federal jurisdiction. The issue here
-whether a purpose to invoke federal jurisdiction, without any reten-
tion of interest, will show that a party has been improperly or collu-
sively made or joined-is to be distinguished from the second section
1359 test. The latter test is whether such a purpose exists at all.
Supreme Court decisions under the 1875 Act 58 seem to hold that a
purpose to invoke federal jurisciction, by itself, is not improper or col-
lusive.59 However, some district courts have concluded that section
1359 requires a consideration of motive in determining the propriety
of the transaction. 60 They have distinguished prior Supreme Court
cases on the ground that those decisions only held motive irrelevant
after the transfer or assignment was found to be absolute. When the
question is whether the transfer is absolute, a consideration of the
purpose of the transaction is appropriate. The question has not
56. See, e.g. Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910); Farmington Village Corp.
v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885).
57. Although the scope of this comment is limited to assignments and transfers af-
fecting federal diversity jurisdiction, it should be noted that the courts have also held
that solicitation, control and an agreement to reimburse expenses will fall within the
prohibition of section 1359, even if there is no transfer or assignment. The statute ap-
plies to parties who are improperly made or joined. Cashman v. Amador & Sacramento
Canal Co., 118 U.S. 58 (1886). See Wheeler v. Denver, 229 U.S. 342 (1913) (insufficient
control to call for application of the section 1359 prohibition). See also Matthies v.
Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64 (D. Conn. 1958).
58. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472. See notes 28-30 and accompa-
nying text, supra.
59. See, e.g., Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528 (1891).
60. Ferrera v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967).
affd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968); Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D. P.R. 1951).
Both courts reasoned that the decisions under the 1875 Act only regarded motive as ir-
relevant after the transaction had first been found to be a complete one in which the
transferor or assignor had parted with his entire interest.
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been presented to the Supreme Court since the adoption of section
1359, but in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.61 the Court indicated
that it might reconsider its prior decisions.62
Whether a reconsideration is appropriate depends on the proper
method of determining when the protection afforded by federal diver-
sity jurisdiction is warranted. If that determination is to be made
solely on the basis of the citizenship of the parties, the retained in-
terest test should remain as the sole criterion for determining whether
a transfer or assignment is improper or collusive. This test is the only
one which tells us whether the assignor or transferor may be consi-
dered a party; motive is irrelevant to this determination.
However, if we are to look beyond the citizenship of the parties in
determining whether federal jurisdiction is necessary, a different result
is reached. The purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction is to protect
against the out-of-stater's fear of local prejudice. It has been suggested
that there is no reason to protect a party who has created diversity
himself, for he should be forced to accept the consequences of his vol-
untary actions.63 Is there any reason for protecting an assignee who
has acquired all of the assignor's interest in the subject matter, but
who made the acquisition for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdic-
tion? The obvious distinction is that the assignee has not created di-
versity by himself. However, he has been a party to the creation and,
therefore, should also be forced to accept the consequences of his acts.
More important, it is logical to conclude that the assignment was
made not to gain the protection of federal jurisdiction, but rather to
achieve other benefits of suing in federal court. If the assignor wanted
to avoid local prejudice, he should not have made the assignment.
There would have been no prejudice against him in a court of his own
state, and had suit been brought in another state both he and his op-
ponent would presumably be equally subject to prejudice against
out-of-state litigants. Since the purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction
is to protect non-residents, rather than to secure for them whatever
procedural advantages there are to suing in federal court, federal jur-
isdiction seems unnecessary when a purpose to invoke it is found to
accompany an assignment or transfer. The section 1359 prohibition
61. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
62. Id. at 828 n.9.
63. Comment, Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and Section 1359, 69
COLuM. L. REV. 706, 722-23 (1969).
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should apply whenever such a purpose is found, regardless of whether
the transaction is one in which the assignor or transferor parts with his
entire interest in the subject matter. But until the complete transaction
rule is changed, the "improperly or collusively" test and the purpose
test will remain separate and it will continue to be possible to bring a
claim within federal jurisdiction by assigning it to another solely
to create such jurisdiction, so long as the transferor parts with all his
interest.
Even though the transferor or assignor has retained an interest,
making the transaction improper or collusive, the prohibition in sec-
tion 1359 will not necessarily apply. By the terms of section 1359 it-
self, exercise of jurisdiction by the district courts is barred only if such
a transaction is accompanied by a purpose to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion 3 4 Before examining the facts which indicate a motive to invoke
federal jurisdiction, one important distinction must be noted. It is a
motive to invoke federal jurisdiction generally, not a motive to invoke
the jurisdiction of a particular federal court, which calls for applica-
tion of the statutory prohibition in cases involving an improper or col-
lusive transfer or assignment. For example, a citizen of Washington
with a claim against a citizen of Oregon, over which a federal court
would normally have jurisdiction, might assign part of that claim to a
California resident to enable the suit to be brought in a federal court
in California. Reasoning that the phrase "such court" in section 1359
means a particular federal court, it might be argued that jurisdiction
should not be exercised. However, motive to invoke the jurisdiction of
a particular federal court does not call for the application of the sec-
tion 1359 prohibition if diversity of citizenship exists between the as-
signor and the assignee's opponent.65 The issue under section 1359 is
one of jurisdiction, not venue.
The question of what facts will show a motive to invoke federal ju-
risdiction has not been given much consideration by the federal
courts. In many cases, such a motive has been stipulated or admitted,
and the courts have concentrated on the question of whether the as-
64. The courts have uniformly held that the motive test need not be made if the tran-
sition is not first shown to be improper or collusive. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab &
Trans. Co., v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans. Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See gener-
ally 3AJ. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.05, at 157 (2d ed. 1968).
65. Sterrett v. Hydro-United Tire Corp., 32 F.2d 823 (E.D. Pa. 1929); Stimson v.
United Wrapping Mach. Co., 156 F. 298 (W.D.N.Y. 1907): Bolles v. Lehigh Valley R.
Co., 127 F. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
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signment or transfer was improper or collusive. 66 In other cases the
courts seem to presume the motive was to invoke federal jurisdiction
because no other motive appeared. 67 However, some motive-establish-
ing characteristics have been identified. For example, a transfer to a
corporation which had no business other than bringing suits based on
diversity of citizenship was held to show a motive to invoke federal
jurisdiction. 68 A similar motive was shown by a history of state court
actions concerning the same property by the transferor or assignor
prior to the transaction by which the assignee or transferee acquired
title.69
A more difficult question is whether the court should exercise juris-
diction when one motive for the transfer or assignment is to invoke
federal jurisdiction, but other motives are also present. In Bullard v.
City of Cisco70 the United States Supreme Court adopted a "dominant
purpose" test. The Court held that the principal purpose of a transfer
of bonds to a trustee was to enable a satisfactory adjustment of the
defendant's financial difficulties and that this motive would prevail
over the motive to invoke federal jurisdiction.71 The same tolerance
policy has allowed the exercise of jurisdiction where one of the pur-
poses for the transfer or assignment to a citizen of another state was
the dissolution of a partnership72 and an effort to gain benefits of the
corporate laws of another state, even though a purpose to invoke fed-
eral jurisdiction was also found.73 Economic considerations for a
66. See, e.g., Lake County Comm'rs v. Dudley, 173 U.S. 245 (1899); Lehigh Mining
and Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895).
67. Farmington Village Corp. v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885); Ferrera v. Phila-
delphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967), affd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.
1968).
68. Southern Realty Ins. Co. v. Walker, 211 U.S. 603 (1909).
69. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irr. Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908); Lehigh
Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895); Hayden v. Manning, 106 U.S. 586
(1883).
70. 290 U.S. 179 (1933). Bullard involved an assignment to create the amount in
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). The assignors were citizens of
New York and Ohio and the defendant was a Texas city. However, the same test should
apply to assignments to create diversity of citizenship.
71. Id. at 190.
72. Dickson v. Tattnal County Hospital Authority, 316 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
The Dickson court found that the transferor parted with his entire interest in the subject
matter in controversy. However, the court considered motive in determining whether
the transaction was improper or collusive. See text accompanying notes 62-66, supra.
73. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Curlee Clothing Co., 19 F.2d 439 (8th Cir.
1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 585 (1928). The transfer had been planned for several
years before the controversy arose.
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transfer might also predominate over a motive to invoke federal juris-
diction.74
On its face, section 1359 does not provide for a consideration of
other purposes. If the assignment or transfer is improper or collusive,
a motive to invoke federal jurisdiction should call for an application
of the statutory prohibition, regardless of whether other purposes can
be shown. However, justification for the dominant purpose test would
be that individuals should not be precluded from making transfers and
assignments merely because such transactions may affect federal juris-
diction. It might be argued that freedom of interstate movement and
of economic activity demand that this test be retained. An assignee or
transferee should not lose his right to sue and be sued in federal court
if, for example, economic reasons for a transfer predominate over a
purpose to invoke federal jurisdiction. This argument, however, ig-
nores the appropriate test for determining whether a federal court
should take jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship: is the
protection that jurisdiction affords necessary? The same argument
made earlier in discussing whether such a purpose, by itself, made a
transfer or assignment improper or collusive is applicable here. A
purpose to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction indicates an attempt to
secure procedural benefits of federal jurisdiction, not its protection, so
the section 1359 prohibition should apply regardless of the existence
of other purposes. Thus, only if the transaction is not motivated by a
purpose to invoke federal jurisdiction should the district court hear
the case.75
B. Assignments and Transfers to Defeat Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction
By its terms, section 1359 does not apply to assignments or trans-
74. National Surety Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp 173 (E.D. Ark.
1968). The transferor was in the loan business and its ability to borrow depended upon
its having as few fixed assets as possible. It transferred fixed assets to a subsidiary in re-
turn for a note and mortgage. The court did not consider whether the economic reasons
for the transfer were dominant because it held the transfer was complete and, therefore,
not improper or collusive. However, the factual situation illustrates a case in which the
dominant motive test may include a consideration of economic motives.
75. For a discussion of the motive problem see Comment, Appointment of
Non-Resident Administrators to Create Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L. J.
873, 881-82 (1963). Cf. Comment, Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and
Section 1359, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 706 (1969).
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fers which defeat federal diversity jurisdiction. The courts, although
sometimes reluctantly,76 have recognized this limitation.77 Thus, a cit-
izen of Oregon with a claim against a citizen of Washington might as-
sign it to another Washington citizen and effectively prohibit the dis-
trict pourts from hearing the case.78 There are two cases in which an
assignment or transfer might not defeat federal diversity jurisdiction.
In the example *above, if the Washington assignee sued the Wash-
ington defendant in a state court in Oregon, the defendant might at-
tempt to remove the case to federal court. The district court might
totally disregard the assignee if he is merely a nominal or formal
party,79 and the court might then dismiss the suit or delay it until the
assignor was made a party.80 The same result might be reached if the
potential defendant, a citizen of Washington, had assigned his interest
to a citizen of Oregon and the Oregon plaintiff attempted to bring a
suit in federal court. However, it is very difficult to prove that one is a
nominal party. The courts have held that the assignment of only the
legal title to a tort claim is enough to defeat federal diversity jurisdic-
tion8l ahd have even decided that the jurisdiction was defeated where
the assignee received only one one-hundreth interest in a tort claim.82
The limitation of section 1359 to devices which create federal di-
versity jurisdiction has been criticized as "an undeniably inequitable
rule" because only plaintiffs may attempt to take advantage of such
devices.83 This may be true in cases in which the potential defendant
cannot assign his interest as, for example, in tort cases. An injured
party might assign part of his claim to a citizen of the same state as
the defendant, thus prohibiting the defendant from removing a case
brought in a court in the state of which the injured party was a citizen.
But this criticism is not true in every case. A landowner anticipating a
76. Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mo. 1969).
77. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43 (1886); Krenzien v. United Services Life Ins.
Co., 121 F. Supp. 243 (D. Kan. 1954).
78. If the Washington assignee sued the Washington defendant in an Oregon state
court, the defendant could not remove the case because diversity of citizenship is
lacking. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a) (1970). If the suit was commenced in a state
court in Washington, the defendant could not remove to federal court even if the suit
was brought by an Oregon plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970).
79. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 24, at 82-83 (1970). See
also Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U.S. 436 (1908).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), 19.
81. Bernblum v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
82. Heape v. Sullivan, 233 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
83. 40 VA. L. REV. 803, 804 (1954).
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suit by a citizen of another state challenging his title might convey his
title to a citizen of that state, thereby preventing the potential plaintiff
from bringing a suit in federal court. A potential defendant in a con-
tract case might just as easily assign his interest.
It has also been argued that since federal diversity jurisdiction is
justifiable,8 4 devices to defeat it should not be permitted 85 On the
other hand, allowing devices to defeat that jurisdiction has been sup-
ported on the grounds that they help "alleviate the chronic
over-crowded condition of the dockets in the federal courts." s6 How-
ever, this argument apparently presumes that state court dockets are
less crowded, a grossly inaccurate assumption.8 7 Moreover, there are
better ways to alleviate the crowded conditions in the federal courts.88
Another argument in favor of allowing such jurisdiction-defeating
devices is that they keep cases determined by state law in the state
courts.89 This contention goes to the basic criticism of federal diver-
sity jurisdiction, that it is contrary to the basic principles of federalism
because it interferes with state autonomy. 90 It is urged that the judicial
power of each state should be co-extensive with its legislative power 9'
and that federal diversity jurisdiction undercuts the power of state
courts.9 2 This argument is often rebutted by contending that diversity
cases are part of the federal court system.9 3
84. Federal diversity jurisdiction has often been attacked. For a discussion of a bill
introduced in the 1930's to abolish it see Comment, Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 31 MIcH. L. REV. 59 (1932).
85. 47YAIEL. J. 145(1938).
86. The business of federal courts has increased substantially since World War 11. S.
REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). But see Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdic-
tion-An Opposing View, 17 So. CAR. L. REV. 677, 680 (1965) (arguing that there is no
evidence of uniformly crowded conditions in the federal courts).
87. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. Rrv. 317, 319 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Wright], Howland, Shall Federal
Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of Different States be Preserved', 18
A.B.A.J. 499. 501 ( 1932).
88. See, e.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 11954) (concur-
ring opinion): Moore and Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future,
43 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 26 (1964); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YNLE
L.J. 1, 13 (1963). Most frequently cited is expansion of the federal judiciary.
89. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 160 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALl STUDY].
90. Field, Diversity of Citizenship: A Response to Judge Wright, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
489, 494 (1967).
91. ALI STUDY, supra note 89, at 99.
92. For example, there is no state court review of federal decisions interpreting
state law. For a discussion of this problem see S. GOtDMAN & T. JAHNIGE. TitE FEDERAL
COUR FS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 20 (1971).
93. Moore and Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43
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All of these arguments ignore the proper basis for determining
whether devices to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction should be per-
mitted. "The basic question is the promotion of the administration of
justice, not political compromise. 94 Thus, the only relevant factor is
the purpose of the power of federal courts to hear controversies be-
tween citizens of different states. As noted earlier, 95 that purpose is to
protect against non-residents' fear of local prejudice. That fear is of
no concern when an assignment or transfer is made to defeat federal
jurisdiction, because the suit will be tried either in the state of which
the assignee's adversary is a citizen or in a state of which neither the
assignee or his adversary are citizens, in which case both stand on the
same footing. The adversary may complain that there is prejudice
against him in his own state,96 but that is not a concern of federal di-
versity jurisdiction.97 Thus, it is appropriate that section 1359 does
not apply to devices to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction.
C. An Appraisal
1. The Need to Limit Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
There are both practical and theoretical justifications for limiting
federal diversity jurisdiction. As noted in the previous section,98 it has
been argued that that jurisdiction, by which federal courts decide
cases to be determined by state law, is an infringement on the au-
tonomy of the states. This has been identified as essentially a states'
rights argument99 which is of diminished importance today. However,
there is a more compelling reason for limiting federal diversity jurisdic-
tion. That jurisdiction should be limited to cases in which the protec-
tion it affords is necessary.
TEXAS L. REV. 1, 25 (1964); THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 588-90 (J. Hamilton ed. 1909)
(A. Hamilton).
94. Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA.
L. REV. 869, 887 (1931).
95. See notes 12-24 and accompanying text, supra.
96. ALI STUDY, supra note 89, at 107.
97. Denial of access to federal courts in such cases is justified on the ground that a
resident is properly held responsible for the actions of the courts of his state because he
has the power to change them. Id. However, it is questionable how much one individual
can do. See also Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Controversies Be-
tween Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.A.J. 71, 73 (1933).
98. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text, supra.
99. H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 164 (1971).
701
Washington Law Review
Many "practical" reasons for limiting federal diversity jurisdiction
have been identified. Some of the most important are: (1) it causes
congestion in the federal courts, due both to the number of diversity
cases 00 and to the special burdens incident to deciding diversity
cases; 101 (2) it makes for a waste of the federal judiciary; 02 (3) federal
diversity jurisdiction is discriminatory because only the non-resident
gets a choice of jurisdiction' 03 and because the expense of suing in
federal court makes it difficult for poor people to bring actions
there;' 04 and (4) it places property rights above human rights because,
with few exceptions, a non-resident may not remove state criminal cases
to the federal courts.105 These reasons have all been advanced as sup-
porting the complete abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction. Al-
though complete abolition does not seem warranted, 0 6 these reasons
at least justify a restriction of that jurisdiction to those cases in which
its exercise is necessary. 107 Statutes restricting jurisdiction, however,
should be precise and clear enough to allow predictable and easy ap-
plication. With the present section 1359, this is not the case.
2. The Special Problems of Section 1359
The major problem with section 1359 is the use of the words "im-
properly" and "collusively." "As words used to delineate jurisdiction,
they ought to be cast in black and white, but we find them in the deci-
100. Burdick, Diversity Jurisdiction Under the American Law Institute Proposals:
Its Purpose and Its Effect on State and Federal Courts, 48 N.D.L. REV. 1 (1971).
101. Wright, supra note 87, at 321-22 (arguing that the burden is not excessive).
102. ALI STUDY, supra note 89 at 100. For a discussion of methods to avoid this
problem see Wright, supra note 87 at 323-25.
103. One commentator has argued that this is a problem with the removal power,
not with federal diversity jurisdiction. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent At-
tacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433, 438-39 (1932). See also Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.AJ. 71,
73(1933).
104. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J.
433, 438 (1932) (arguing the expense is not so onerous). For an argument that the ex-
pense of suing in federal court is no greater than the expense of suing in state court see
Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of Different
States be Preserved?, 18 A.B.A.J. 499, 501 (1932).
105. S. REP. No. 530, 72d Cong., IstSess. (1932).
106. The recent proposed revision of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, S. 1876,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), still provides for federal diversity jurisdiction. The Amer-
ican Law Institute, which authored the proposals in the bill, acknowledges the need for
that jurisdiction in certain cases. ALI STUDY, supra note 89, at 106-110.
107. Cf. ALI STUDY, supra note 89, at 108.
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sional gray zone."1 08 As the discussion in part I indicated, the courts
have spent much time attempting to establish more definite meanings.
This experience "has demonstrated the inappropriateness of such im-
precise terms to establish jurisdictional boundaries."' 09 A checklist of
factors showing the assignor or transferor has retained an interest in
the subject matter in controversy is helpful, but the courts must still
spend time examining jurisdictional facts. A new approach is neces-
sary. The final section of this comment examines a workable alterna-
tive to the difficult language of section 1359.
CONCLUSION-AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
On May 14, 1971, Senator Burdick of North Dakota introduced a
bill, the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971, which provides for a
substantial revision of federal jurisdiction. 011 If adopted, the new bill
would change section 1359 in two ways. The first subsection of the
new version would retain the improper or collusive prohibition now in
section 1359 and, in addition, would prohibit the district courts from
hearing cases "in which any party has been made or joined... pur-
suant to agreement or understanding between opposing parties, in
order to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.""' This addition
would have little effect on transfers and assignments affecting federal
diversity jurisdiction, for none of the cases has involved such an agree-
ment between opposing parties. The second subsection, dealing spe-
cifically with assignments and transfers, is more significant:"12
Whenever an object of a sale, assignment or other transfer of the
whole or any part of any interest in a claim or other property has been
to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction... juris-
diction of a civil action shall be determined as if such sale, assign-
ment or other transfer had not occurred.
108. Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928
(1962).
109. Ferrera v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967),
affd, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
110. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The bill was authored by the American
Law Institute. See ALI STUDY, supra note 89.
111. S. 1876, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(e)(1) (1971). This provision would become 28
U.S.C. § 1307(a).
112. Id. This provision would become 28 U.S.C. § 1307(b).
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This represents a substantial departure from present law and is almost
a return to the provision in section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 17 89.113
The only difference is that the new provision does not apply unless
"an object" of the transaction is to invoke federal jurisdiction, while
the section 11 prohibition was absolute if jurisdiction were otherwise
affected.
The virtue of the second subsection is its simplicity. The courts
must only determine whether an object of the transaction was to de-
feat or invoke federal jurisdiction.11 4 If such an object is shown, the
courts need not embark on the time consuming process of running
through a checklist of factors indicating the assignor or transferor has
retained an interest in the subject matter. As noted earlier,1 15 a pur-
pose to invoke federal jurisdiction should be enough, by itself, to pro-
hibit the district court from hearing the case. The major difficulty with
the second subsection is that it applies to devices to defeat federal ju-
risdiction. Because of the need to limit federal jurisdiction in diversity
cases and, more importantly, because the protection that jurisdiction
affords is unnecessary where federal jurisdiction has been defeated,
this provision should be omitted.1 16
The first subsection of the bill should be abandoned. First, omitting
the improper or collusive test will make the jurisdictional issue clear.
Second, the situations which the first subsection was probably in-
tended to cover may be handled in more precise ways. The problem of
the appointment of non-resident administrators, executors and guard-
ians is already solved in other parts of the new bill.' 17 Changes of
domicile to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction may be handled by
providing that domicile at the time the cause of action arises is deter-
minative, rather than domicile at the time the action is commenced.118
113. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. See note 25 and accompanying
text, supra.
114. Whether an object of the transaction was to defeat or invoke federal jurisdic-
tion will depend on the intent of the parties to the transaction.
115. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text, supra. For an argument that this rule
is too harsh, and that a "but-for" test could be adopted see Comment, Manufactured
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and Section 1359, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 706, 726 (1969).
116. See notes 86-97 and accompanying text, supra.
117. First, transfer is defined to include such an appointment. S. 1876, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2(e)(l) (1971). This provision would become 28 U.S.C. § 1307(b). More
important, executors, administrators, guardians and the like would be deemed citizens
of the state of the person they represent. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(e)(1) (1971).
This provision would become 28 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(3).
118. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914) (domicile at time of suit deter-
mines jurisdiction).
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The courts already have the power to deny jurisdiction if the parties
improperly agree to invoke federal jurisdiction.1 19 If the first subsec-
tion is intended to include the retained interest test, the subsection
might still be abandoned because the courts need no legislative au-
thority to apply this test.120 Thus, by omitting the first subsection and
the reference to devices to defeat federal jurisdiction in the second sec-
tion, the proposal would be both appropriate and clear.
Further improvement on the problem of assignments and transfers
to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction could be made if the retained
interest test were abandoned. This would leave the courts with only
the motive test in determining whether jurisdiction exists. Once freed
from the examination of factors showing a retained interest, the courts
could focus on precisely defining situations in which an object to in-
voke federal jurisdiction is shown. The end result would be certainty
with respect to the jurisdictional issue, freeing the courts for their
most important function, a decision on the merits. However, before
the retained interest test can be abandoned Congress must abolish the
complete diversity rule.' 2 ' This would be a radical step, certainly
against the trend of limiting federal diversity jurisdiction, and is un-
likely. Thus, it is the duty of the courts to further refine the checklist
of factors showing the assignor or transferor has retained an interest
in the subject matter, with a view to making the list even more precise
and comprehensive.
Barry E. Wolf*
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 provides that "Parties may be dropped or added by order of
the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just." Thus, if the opponents agreed that one who might have been
named as a party should be omitted to satisfy the complete diversity rule, the court
might require that that individual be added and then deny jurisdiction.
120. See note 39 and accompanying text, supra.
121. For an argument which would support the abolition of the complete diversity
rule see Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 18-25 (1968).
* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1972, University of Washington.
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